The Palestine/Israel Pulse: A Joint Poll (January 2023) conducted by program head Dr. Nimrod Rosler of the International MA in Conflict Resolution and Mediation
Press Release & Summary Report
These are the results of Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the program head of the International Program in Conflict Resolution and Mediation at Tel Aviv University with funding from the Netherlands Representative Office in Ramallah and the Representative Office of Japan to Palestine through UNDP/PAPP. The joint poll was conducted during December 2022.
● Support for the two-state solution drops significantly among Palestinians and Israeli Jews, from 43% in September 2020 to 33% among the Palestinians and 34% among Israeli Jews. Among all Israelis, Jews and Arabs, 39% in total support the two-state solution. Still, fewer people among Palestinians and Israelis as a whole support two possible alternatives to a two-state solution: one state with equal rights and one state without rights. Among Israeli Jews, however, support for one unequal state under Israeli rule is higher than the two-state solution
● Support for the alternative of a two state confederation has varied over time, with different dynamics among Israelis and Palestinians. Among the Israeli population, support moved steadily upwards from 2016 through late 2017 and 2018, then fell once again to the same level as 2016, with 28% in total at present. Among Palestinians, support for a confederation plan reflects similar dynamics to other solutions: a mostly consistent downward trajectory from 2016 onwards, and 22% total support at present. The current survey for the first time tested five component aspects of the two state confederation, regarding freedom of movement, citizenship and residency for refugees and settlers, Jerusalem and joint authorities for civic affairs; most did not reach 30 percent support among Israeli Jews or Palestinians. The only exception was half of Israeli Jews who support joint civic institutions. However, a majority Israeli Arabs support both the full package and each item (for just one item, support was slightly below half), consistent with their pattern of support for all frameworks for a democratic resolution of the conflict.
● Palestinians and Israelis were presented with a peace package identical to the one we presented to them in September-2020 and 2018 and representing a modified version of the package we presented to both sides five times between 2016 and 2018. Findings show a slight drop in support among the Palestinians from 27% to 26% in 2022 (compared to 42% in mid-2018). But the drop in support among Israeli Jews is higher, from 36% to 31% during the same period (compared to 45% in mid-2018). But support for this permanent peace agreement package among Israeli Arabs rebounded significantly from a low point of 49% two years ago to 62% today. In total, 37% of Israelis support the detailed agreement. The peace package comprises: a de-militarized Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line with equal territorial exchange, family unification in Israel of 100,000 Palestinian refugees, West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall under Israeli sovereignty and the Muslim and Christian quarters and the al Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount under Palestinian sovereignty, Israeli and the future state of Palestine will be democratic, the bilateral agreement will be part of a larger peace agreement with all Arab states, the US and major Arab countries will ensure full implementation of the agreement by both sides, and the end of the conflict and claims. Fifty four percent of all Israelis (62% of Israeli Jews) and 72% of Palestinians are opposed to this two-state comprehensive package.
● The survey also tested the likely impact of previously tested reciprocal incentives on the level of support for the peace package. Drawing on seven such incentives, we paired measures that show reciprocal benefits but also costs for each side. This is the third time that we have conducted this experiment. In this experiment, we kept the same pairs that were proven successful in changing attitudes among Palestinians and Israeli Jews in favor of the peace package and replaced those that were less effective. Findings in the previous experiment, in September 2020, showed significant success among Israeli Jews for most of the paired incentives while only half of the pairs were successful among the Palestinians. The current findings show significant potential for success among both publics, but the success among Israeli Jews remains greater: five of the seven pairs generated higher levels of support for the peace package among Israeli Jews while on the Palestinian side only two generated higher levels of support. As a result, two pairs caused a majority of Jewish Israelis to say they were more likely to support the package while none of the paired incentives convinced a majority of Palestinians to say they were more likely to support the detailed two-state package.
● The survey examined for the first time support for four bi-lateral potential confidence building measures. While none of them received majority support among Palestinians, two – referring Palestinian actions to prevent attacks, and removing incitement in Palestinian textbooks while allowing Palestinians of East Jerusalem to vote in PA elections – received support of about half of Israeli Jews.
● When both sides are offered four similar options for what should happen next on the conflict, 31% of the Palestinians (29% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip), 30% of Israeli Jews choose “reach a peace agreement.” This represents a decrease in support for a peace agreement among Palestinians and Israeli Jews compared to only 34% and 41% respectively who chose this option in 2020. 40% of Palestinians (compared to 37% two years ago) opt to “wage an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Among Israeli Jews, 26% call for “a definitive war with the Palestinians” compared to 19% in 2022.
● As in previous surveys, levels of trust in the other side are very low: 86% of Palestinians and 85% of Israeli Jews believe the other side is not trustworthy.
● Each side perceives itself as an exclusive victim (84% of Palestinians and 84% of Israeli Jews), while an overwhelming majority of Palestinians (90%) but only a smaller majority of Israeli Jews (63%) think this suffering grants them with a moral right to do anything they deem as necessary for survival. A vast majority among both groups (93%) see themselves as rightful owners of the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan river. While a third of Israeli Jews are willing to accept some ownership right of the Palestinians, only 7% of Palestinians are willing to accept such idea about the Jews.